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Abstract: This paper shows how a world price shock can increase the like-
lihood that democratization must be used to resolve the threat of revolution.
Initially, a ruling elite may be able to use trade policy to maintain political
stability. But a world price shock can push the country into a situation where
the elite face a commitment problem that only democratization can resolve.
Because the world price shock may also reduce average incomes, the model
provides a way to understand why the level of national income per capita
and democracy may not be positively correlated. The model is also useful for
understanding dictatorial regimesrebuttal of World Bank calls to keep their
export markets open in the face of the 2007-08 world food crisis.
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1. Introduction
Lipsets modernization hypothesis, that the level of income per capita and hence eco-
nomic development drives the creation and consolidation of democracy, has recently come
into question. By estimating Markov transition models, Przeworski , Alvarez, Cheibub
and Limongi (2000) failed to nd a signicant relationship between the level of income
per capita and the likelihood of transition to democracy. Taking a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
approach, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008) replicate this nding by con-
trolling for country-specic factors a¤ecting both income and democracy. Although these
ndings have themselves been challenged, they are taken to be supportive of the new in-
stitutional economicsview that political and economic institutions form the foundations
of long-run economic growth (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005).
With these developments, economists have begun to consider ways in which democ-
ratization might take place without any systematic reliance on increases in income. The
present paper shows how democratization can arise as a result of a world price shock
that may actually reduce average incomes. Throughout history price shocks, especially
food price shocks, have been a key trigger of social unrest, in some cases giving rise to
democratization.3 Yet price shocks have largely been overlooked in prior models of de-
mocratization since these tend to be based on single-sector macro models that have no
role for prices. Since the model that we will develop in the present paper has the under-
lying structure of an international trade model with two sectors, the role of price shocks
in creating the potential for democratization can be analyzed in a natural way.
Drawing on Zissimos (2014), the model of this present paper combines Acemoglu and
Robinsons (2000) closed economy model of democratization with a standard Heckscher-
Ohlin (H-O) model of international trade to consider how price shocks can a¤ect democra-
tization. Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, henceforth AR), the ruling dictatorial
elite may face a commitment problem in their attempts to address a threat of revolution
by the rest of society. The elite would like to be able to make transfers over time large
enough to quell the threat of revolution. But it is common knowledge that if the rest of
societys ability to coordinate over revolution subsides in future then so will the credibility
3See Carter, Rausser and Smith (2011) for a review of the literature showing that commodity price
volatility can provoke political as well as economic instability.
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of any commitment to make transfers. Through the 2 2 H-O model, transfers are made
using international trade policy. For concreteness, and to understand the events of the
2007-08 world food crisis, we will assume that the elite own land used intensively in the
production of food while the rest of society own labor used intensively in manufacturing.
We will also assume that the country is relatively land abundant so that it has a compar-
ative advantage in food. By the Stolper-Samuelson theorem there is a conict of interest
over international trade policy: the ruling elite, as owners of the abundant factor, prefer
a relatively open regime while the rest of society would prefer a relatively closed one.
The model focuses on countries that are at an early stage of development and lack
domestic scal capacity, so domestic taxation cannot be used as in AR to make transfers.
But the ruling elite can e¤ectively make transfers to the rest of society using trade policy.
If the commitment problem is binding the elite cannot redistribute on a su¢ cient scale to
maintain the status quo (i.e. avert a revolution) using trade policy. The elite can resolve
the commitment problem by extending the franchise though, hence making a credible
commitment over time to the trade policy that the rest of society would prefer. But if the
commitment problem is not binding then the elite would prefer to maintain the status
quo using trade policy, thereby retaining the ability to set trade policy to their advantage
in future.4
The circumstances under which the elite must democratize in order to avoid a revo-
lution and when they can use trade policy to maintain the status quo are similar to those
in AR for domestic scal policy. It is when there is a high probability that the rest of
society will be able to e¤ectively coordinate their e¤orts to mount a revolution that the
elite can use trade policy to maintain the status quo. The reason is that if the probability
of being able to coordinate is su¢ ciently high then the rest of societys expected return
through favorable trade policy is at least as great as through revolution, which bears a
cost. It is when this probability is low that the commitment problem binds and democ-
ratization must be used instead to avoid a revolution. By lowering the rest of societys
income, the food price shock is shown to increase the range of probabilities over which the
commitment problem is binding and thereby increase the likelihood of democratization.
4Low income countries generally lack domestic scal capacity and so rely extensively on trade policies
for scal purposes including redistribution: see Zissimos (2014) for references.
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The model can be used to understand the events of the 2007-08 world food crisis
which increased the relative price of food. Between 2007 and 2011 an estimated 33
food-exporting countries resorted to restrictions on exports of grains, rice, and other
foodstu¤s in response to the initial increase in food prices (Sharma 2011). A number of
these countries were dictatorships such as Egypt and Jordan. And as owners of land,
the abundant factor, the ruling elites in these countries stood to gain signicantly by
leaving export markets open during the period of food price shocks. However, the rest of
society su¤ered signicant negative income shocks and protested violently on the streets
in response. In some countries the e¤ects of the shocks could be o¤set by the elite using
export restrictions. But in other cases such as Egypt the rest of society were arguably
pushed out of the range where trade policy could be used to maintain political stability
and into the range where democratization would be required to maintain the status quo.5
The present paper simplies the model of Zissimos (2014) by moving from an innite
time horizon framework to a two-period one. This simplication makes it easier to see
how a world price shock could push the feasible outcome from one where trade policy
can be used to maintain the status quo to one where democratization is required to avert
a revolution. Zissimos (2014) does analyze the implications of a world price shock but,
di¤erently from the present paper, does so by focusing an a situation where the status
quo can be maintained using trade policy before and after the shock.
Since the economic and political structure is based on Zissimos (2014), the relation-
ship to the literature is similar (see Zissimos 2014 for a review). By focusing on how
democratization becomes more likely as the result of a food price shock, the present pa-
per forges closer links than Zissimos (2014) to the literature on income and democratiza-
tion. Following Lipset (1959), important works such as Huntington (1991), Rusechemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens (1992) argue in favor of a causal positive relationship between
income and democracy. The main argument that there might be a negative relationship
between income and democracy is based on the idea that people are more likely to protest
in favor of democracy when the opportunity cost of doing so is su¢ ciently low (Acemoglu
5It remains to be seen whether democracy successfully consolidates in a number of the countries such
as Egypt that have had revolutions in the Arab Spring. The theoretical framework of this paper assumes
that democracy consolidates with certainty and revolution is not observed on the equilibrium path. The
logic extends to a framework where both assumptions are relaxed.
3
and Robinson 2006). The present paper shows how the range over which this opportunity
cost becomes su¢ ciently low is determined partly by world prices.6
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the economic model and uses
this to characterize the levels of trade policy intervention that would be preferred by the
elite and the rest of society respectively. Section 3 then uses the model to determine the
parameter range over which trade policy can be used to maintain the status quo. Section
4 then shows how a price shock reduces the parameter range over which trade policy
can be used to maintain the status quo, increasing the likelihood of democratization.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. The H-O Model with International Trade Policy
The model developed in this section is adapted from the innite time horizon model of
Zissimos (2014) to a two period setting. The model is of a small country that takes
world prices as given, populated by a continuum of risk-neutral citizens. Each citizen
belongs either to the elite, e, or the rest of society,n (for non-elite). The mass of each
of these groups is normalized to  and 1 respectively, where the elite are in a minority:
 < 1.7 The economy is endowed with a unit each of land and labor. Each member of the
elite is endowed with an equal share of land while all of the labor is distributed evenly
across the rest of society. The only di¤erence between the respective groups is their factor
endowments. The model has two time periods, t = 1; 2.
The production structure is standard 22 H-O, where the two goods are food, f , and
manufactures, m; food is land intensive while manufactures are labor intensive. Since the
model is standard H-O, we can make use of standard results. By the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem,
rt > p

t > 0 > w

t
6The opportunity cost of revolution is also discussed in the context of an open economy model by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, Ch.10). Surprisingly, in a similar land-abundant environment their pre-
diction is the opposite of ours: trade opening makes democratization less likely. The key di¤erence is
that they examine a setting in which the commitment problem is always binding and do not consider the
possibility that endogenously determined trade policy might be used to maintain the status quo.
7The assumption that the elite are in a minority is made to ensure that democratization shifts the
power to set policy from the elite to the rest of society.
4
where rt and wt are the rental rate and wage rate and pt is the domestic relative price of
food, which can lie anywhere between the world price and the autarky price, in period t
respectively. A superscript- on a variable z denotes proportional change: z = dz=z.
Agents j 2 fe; ng have identical preferences and the same discount factor,  < 1. The
expected utility of agent j in period 1 is given by U j1 = E1
 
u
 
cjf1; c
j
m1

+ u
 
cjf2; c
j
m2

where E1 is the expectations operator conditional on information available in period 1.
Utility in period 2 is given by U j2 = u
 
cjf2; c
j
m2

. In period t, cjit is consumption of
good i 2 ff;mg by agent j. The per-period utility function is given by the quasi-
linear functional form u
 
cjft; c
j
mt

= cjmt + uf
 
cjft

where the sub-utility function uf () is
di¤erentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.
Since there is no domestic scal capacity, the only policy instruments available are
trade taxes. For convenience, and without loss of generality, we will assume that trade
policy is applied to food. We will assume throughout that the abundant factor is land, so
the country has a comparative advantage in food and the trade policy instrument is an
export tax. Any revenue collected from a trade policy is rebated to each individual j in
lump sum.8 Then the net revenue function for an individual j, trj (pt), is determined as
follows:
trj (pt) = (pt   pw)

df (pt)  1
1 + 
xf (pt)

; (2.1)
where pw is the world relative price of food, while df (pt) and xf (pt) are the domestic de-
mand and supply functions for food; d0f (pt) < 0, x
0
f (pt) > 0. Since the policy instrument
is an export tax, pt  pw and so trj (pt)  0.
2.1. Welfare of the Groups and their Preferred Levels of Openness
The total income of individual j 2 fe; ng is given by the sum of factor income and trade
policy revenue: Y jt = Y
j (pt) = y
j (pt) + tr
j (pt). Given the quasi-linear structure of
preferences, individual js welfare can be expressed as follows:
W jt = W
j (pt) = y
j (pt) + tr
j (pt) + sf (pt) ;
8Alternatively we could have assumed that the elite keeps the trade policy revenue for itself, only
redistributing it to the rest of society when this would be helpful in averting a revolution. Introducing
this possibility would not change our results qualitatively, but would a¤ect the parameter range for which
the commitment problem becomes binding.
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where sf (pt)  uf [df (pt)]  ptdf (pt) is the consumer surplus derived from consumption
of good f , and W j (pt) is assumed to be concave in pt.
From this welfare function, we can derive preferred price levels for the elite, p^e, and
the rest of society, p^n, respectively. We have already seen by the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem that the elite will prefer a relatively high price of food, pt, since this raises their
factor income, and it follows that p^e > p^n. While each preferred price level would be put
in place using an export tax, we will follow the international trade literature by focusing
on the corresponding price level itself.
If the country has a comparative advantage in food then pw > pa, where pa is the
relative price of food in autarky. In that case the elites welfare is maximized at a higher
level of openness than is the rest of societys since the elite own the abundant factor.
Note that in general it could be the case that p^e > pw and/or pa > p^n. But p^e > pw
would imply an export subsidy on food while pa > p^n would imply an import subsidy
on manufactures. And any trade subsidy would require revenue to be raised through
domestic taxation. Under our assumption that there is no domestic scal capacity, the
funding constrained solutions are p^e = pw and p^n = pa. We will use these funding
constrained solutions to simplify the analysis below.9
3. Trade Policy and the Form of Government
Initially, (de jure) political power is held by the elite, which they exercise through their
control of trade policy. While the elite hold power they set pt directly. Denote the value
of pt chosen by the elite as pet .
To simplify the analysis, we will assume that in period 1 the threat level to the elite
is high (H), in that the rest of society are able to resolve their coordination problem and
can mount a revolution if they wish. If they mount a revolution then it is successful with
certainty, but costs  to each member of society (the elite and the rest of society). In
period 2, with probability  the state will remain at H. But with probability 1    the
state will switch to low threat(L), in which case the rest of society cannot coordinate
and hence are unable to mount a revolution.
9Zissimos (2014) justies this simplication at greater length and shows how it can be relaxed.
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If either in period 1 or in period 2 the rest of society mount a revolution they subse-
quently install democracy. Since the elite are in a minority,  < 1, under democracy the
median voter is a member of the rest of society. So democratization involves a transfer of
power to set trade policy from the elite to the rest of society. Democratization can also
arise if the elite extend the franchise voluntarily. Democracy is an absorbing state: once
the franchise has been extended it cannot be rescinded. This assumption enables us to
focus on the use of trade policy to maintain the status quo.
3.1. Addressing the Threat of Revolution
If the elite extend the franchise, they make a credible commitment to p^n in the current
period and the next if there is one. But the elite may alternatively be able to avert
revolution by setting pet at a level whereby the rest of society are just indi¤erent between
mounting a revolution and maintaining the status quo: the status quo pricepst .
In this paper we will not undertake a full characterization of equilibrium. We will
focus instead on characterizing the circumstances under which revolution can be averted
in period 1 using trade policy in principle and when the elite must avert a revolution by
extending the franchise. To do this we will begin by formalizing the payo¤s to the re-
spective groups under the various possible outcomes. Let V j (D; p^n) represent the present
discounted value of democracy in period 1 for j 2 fe; ng. For a member of group j, the
payo¤ to democracy in period 1 takes the form:
V j (D; p^n)  (1 + )W j (p^n) : (3.1)
Denoting the occurrence of revolution by R, the payo¤ to revolution in period 1 is given
by
V j (R; p^n)  (1 + )W j (p^n)   : (3.2)
Clearly, both groups would prefer democracy to revolution because this avoids the cost  
associated with revolution. So an extension of the franchise has the potential to defuse
revolution in period 1.
The payo¤ to a member of the rest of society in period 1 when the elite redistribute
by setting the status quo price ps1 is given by
V n (ps1; p
s
2;H)  W n (ps1) +  (W n (ps2) + (1  )W n (p^e)) ; (3.3)
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where ps2 is the status quo price adopted by the elite in period 2 if the threat level
remains high and p^e is the price they adopt if the threat level switches to low. We can
now examine the circumstances under which it would be feasible for the elite to use trade
policy to prevent a revolution. This is equivalent to working out when it would be feasible
for the elite to credibly commit to a trade policy that would give the rest of society at
least as high a level of welfare as they could obtain from mounting a revolution.
For the purpose of establishing feasibility, let eV n () be the maximum utility that the
elite can induce for the rest of society using trade policy (as an alternative to extending
the franchise). This maximum utility is induced by setting ps1 = p
s
2 = p^
n in (3.3):
eV n ()  V n (p^n; p^n;H) (3.4)
= W n (p^n) + W n (p^e) +  (W n (p^n) W n (p^e))
Then the condition for the elite to feasibly use trade policy to maintain the status quo iseV n ()  V n (R; p^n). We can now illustrate graphically the elites options in maintaining
the status quo using Figure 1a. The value of  is shown in Figure 1a on the horizontal axis
while the welfare level of the rest of society is on the vertical axis. The horizontal dashed
line shows the payo¤ to the rest of society from democracy, as calculated by (3.1). The
horizontal solid line shows the payo¤ to revolution, as given by (3.2), where the vertical
di¤erence between them is given by  . The upward sloping line shows eV n () as given by
(3.4). The intercept of eV n () with the vertical axis, where  = 0, corresponds to the payo¤
that the rest of society would receive from a policy of p^n in period 1 followed by reversion
to p^e in period 2. SinceW n (p^n) > W n (p^e), for the intercept to be smaller than V n (R; p^n)
we only have to choose a value of  su¢ ciently small thatW n (p^n)+W n (p^e) < V n (R; p^n).eV n () slopes upwards from this point because an increase in  increases the likelihood
that in the following period the rest of society can credibly threaten to mount a revolution
and hence obtain a higher level of welfare. At  = 1 the rest of society are able to resolve
their coordination problem and mount a revolution with certainty in the next period.
Then the elite can credibly commit with certainty to set pe2 = p^
n in period 2, inducing the
same level of welfare as democracy. At  = , the rest of society are indi¤erent between
revolution and maintaining the status quo with trade policy.
Now consider the elites options when they face the threat of revolution in period 1.
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We can see from Figure 1a that when resolution of the coordination problem is relatively
unlikely ( < ) the elite cannot credibly commit to raise the rest of societys welfare
using trade policy above the level of revolution. The reason is that the high threat state,
H, in which the rest of society receive the higher payo¤ associated with the status quo
price, is so unlikely to arise in the next period that the rest of society would be better o¤
bearing the cost of revolution  in exchange for being able to set trade policy at pnt = p^
n
in both periods for certain. On the other hand, if resolution of the rest of societys
coordination problem is relatively likely in period 2 ( > ), redistribution using trade
policy is su¢ ciently likely to recur in period 2 that it can be used to avert a revolution.
4. World Price Shocks and Democratization
Based on the framework set out above, the e¤ect of a world price shock can be analyzed
in a straight forward way. Recall that we are assuming p^e = pw. In that case, a world
food price shock that increases the relative price of food also increases p^e. We will be able
to analyze the e¤ect of a shock to pw by letting p^e = pw in (3.4). To analyze a shock to
pw, let us rewrite eV n () where p^e = pw as eV n (; pw).
We will analyze the e¤ects of a food price shock by comparing two situations in the
model, one for pw and one for pw0, where pw0 > pw. An increase in p^e = pw increases the
price that the rest of society must pay for food, thus reducing the rest of societys real
income and hence W n (pw0), if in period 2 the state switches to L. Figure 1b illustrates
two situations: one for pw and eV n (; pw); the other for pw0 and eV n (; pw0). The gure
shows that the intercept of eV n (; pw0) is smaller than for eV n (; pw). Since the endpoint is
the same for eV n (; pw0) as for eV n (; pw), the result of a higher world price pw0 is a higher
value of  at 0. This enlarges the range of values of  from  2 [0; ] to  2 [0; 0] for
which the threat of revolution must be resolved through democratization. Therefore, for
any given value of , it becomes more likely after a positive food price shock that the
threat of revolution can only be resolved by democratization.
It is worth reiterating that although the food price shock reduces the rest of societys
real income it increases the income of the elite. So a food price shock that increases the
likelihood of democratization will only reduce average per capita income if the fall in per
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capita income among the rest of society is large relative to the gain in per capita elite
income and if the elite make up a relatively small share of the total population.
5. Conclusions
The analysis we have undertaken raises two issues. First, the likelihood of democratiza-
tion increases as the result of a price shock, but average incomes do not necessarily rise.
This suggests more broadly that a focus on the underlying mechanisms driving conicts of
interest between di¤erent groups over policy is necessary to fully understand the relation-
ship between income and democratization. The second issue concerns how multilateral
agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Or-
ganization should manage the process of democratization and trade liberalization given
that they may have an important bearing on one another. Calls for trade policy to re-
main open in the face of food price shocks (World Bank 2008) are likely to be ignored
when increasing protectionism is key to political survival. By the same token, calls for
democratization are likely to be ignored unless this is necessary to avert revolution.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J.A. Robinson, (2005); Institutions as a Fundamental
Cause of Long Run Growth.Published as Chapter 6 of P. Aghion and S.N. Durlauf
(eds.) Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1A. Amsterdam, The Netherlands:
Elsevier B.V.
[2] Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson, and P. Yared, (2005); Income and Democ-
racy.American Economic Review, 98(3): 808-842.
[3] Acemoglu, D., and J.A. Robinson, (2000); Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?
Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective.Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115: 1167-1199.
[4] Acemoglu, D., and J.A. Robinson, (2006); Economic Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
10
[5] Carter, C.A., G.C. Rausser and A. Smith, (2011); Commodity Booms and Busts.
Annual Review of Resource Economics, 3: 87118.
[6] Huntington, S.P. (1991); The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
[7] Lipset, S.M. (1959); Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy.American Political Science Review, 53(1): 69-105.
[8] Przeworski, A., M. Alvarez, J.A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi, (2000); Democracy and
Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-being in the World, 1950
1990. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
[9] Rueschemeyer, D., E.H. Stephens, and J.D. Stephens, (1992); Capitalist Development
and Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
[10] Sharma, R., (2011); Food Export Restrictions: Review of the 2007-2011 Experience
and Considerations for Disciplining Restrictive Measures. FAO Commodity and
Trade Policy Research Working Paper 32, Food and Agriculture Organization.
[11] World Bank, (2008); Rising Food Prices: Policy Options and World Bank Re-
sponse.Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
[12] Zissimos, B., (2014); A Theory of Trade Policy Under Dictatorship and Democra-
tization.University of Exeter Economics Department Discussion Paper no. 14/03.
11
